Lubanga Trial Chamber Issues Written Order Denying Stay

Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an order denying a defense request for a stay of the proceedings of the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo on March 7, 2011. The court has ordered the trial to resume, which it since has, as described here.

The order describes a number of instances where the prosecution used intermediaries whose reliability it had reason to doubt, but did not pass the information that the were credibility concerns on to the court or the defense.  The court summarized some of the concerns in this paragraph:

By way of summary, therefore, it is argued that although from a range of
materials Intermediary 316 was clearly to be suspected of providing false
information or eliciting false evidence, the Office of the Prosecutor chose to
continue working with him until at least April 2008, avoiding investigating
the reliability of the material he provided or alerting the Chamber to the
potential difficulties.

Intermediary 316 allegedly convinced at least one witness, witness 16 to falsely claim that he served as a child soldier in Lubanga’s army. Further, Intermediary 316 falsely claimed that his assistant had been murdered and the murderers were out to get him.  When it was found that the assistant was not dead, and other parts of his story of death threats could not be verified, the prosecution continued to use the services of Intermediary 316.  Reports indicated that there were concerns in the Office of the prosecutor about the reliability of his information, but this was not disclosed to the defense or the court, and the OTP continued to use his information.

In addition, the defence alleges that the prosecution was aware that Intermediary 316 was passing false information to the prosecution. It is suggested that internal reports that reached the highest level of the Office of the Prosecutor revealed that Intermediary 316 had lied to the investigators regarding the situation of three potential former FNI child soldiers. The
investigators noted that one of the child soldiers introduced by Intermediary 316 appeared to have been coached. It is said that this was left uninvestigated.322 Moreover, two emails sent by Witness 583 to his superiors in May 2006 set out the doubts that were expressed about expenditure allegedly incurred by Intermediary 316. In an investigator’s note dated 18
June 2010 it is suggested that Intermediary 316 had little credibility as regards events that occurred between 2006 and 2009. When Intermediary 316 was questioned by the Office of the Prosecutor in May 2008, he admitted to having lied, and having persuaded someone else to lie, to the investigators in order to obtain money to meet a personal debt. In October
2008, Intermediary 316 informed the prosecution that his assistant (Witness 183) had been murdered and that his killers were seeking him. He repeated this claim when he was questioned on this again in October 2009 and in November 2010. However, the Prosecutor accepts that Witness 183 is alive. Finally, in May 2008 the Office of the Prosecutor decided not to refer Intermediary 316 to the VWU because the threats he had alleged had not been established, and his family had provided varying accounts of the same events.

The chamber noted similar concerns about the work of another intermediary:

Intermediary 321 encouraged young
boys from [REDACTED] to make false claims to investigators from the
Office of the Prosecutor that they had been enlisted by the armed wing of
the UPC (including Witness 213, Witness 294, Witness 297 and Witness 298,
who each gave evidence). Defence Witness 4 maintained that
Intermediary 321 asked him and others to give a false story to the
prosecution that he had been enlisted in the UPC, and he was promised
assistance, training and money. He said the lies included their names, where
they lived and their ages. He gave evidence that he was coached in his false
account by Intermediary 321, over a number of days.

The defense also raised concerns about the evidence gathered by Intermediary 31:

Intermediary 31 acted as the intermediary for a number of witnesses, and it
is said that he was employed in that general role between 2005 and (at least)
2008. The defence submits that there is reason to suggest that he encouraged
potential witnesses to provide false evidence. The defence refers to events in
February 2006 when concerns were raised as to his credibility and dealings
with him were suspended (it is said the executive committee of the Office of
the Prosecutor was alerted to this turn of events). The defence relies on
evidence concerning his remuneration. Overall, the defence argues that his
employment with the prosecution should have been terminated and any
evidence gathered by him required thorough investigation; instead, it is
averred his services continued to be used and he was called to give
evidence.

The court found that despite repeated violations of disclosure obligation and the possible fabrications of evidence by the intermediaries:

The Chamber is of the view that this is not a situation in which alleged prosecutorial misconduct has disabled the accused from properly defending himself. The Chamber has responded comprehensively to the defence submissions so as to ensure that the totality of the available evidence on the relevant intermediaries is explored during the trial. Four intermediaries have been called to give evidence; the investigators who were principally responsible for each of them have testified; and the prosecution has indicated that it has effected disclosure of all relevant materials, following various rulings by the Chamber. Reverting, therefore, to the question posed by the Chamber in paragraph 166 above, the Chamber is unpersuaded, in these circumstances, that “the accused’s rights have been breached to the extent that a fair trial has been rendered impossible”.

The court found that it is not odius or repugnant to justice to continue the trial of Lubanga under the circumstances, as the court can choose to overlook the unreliable evidence in reaching its determination:

Contrary to the submission of the defence, the Chamber will be able, in
due course, to reach final conclusions on the alleged impact of the
involvement of the intermediaries on the evidence in this case, as well as on
the wider alleged prosecutorial misconduct or negligence based on the
suggested failure by the Office of the Prosecutor to supervise or control the
individual intermediaries and to act on indications of unreliability (together
with the consequences of any adverse findings in this regard, which the
defence alleges taints all the prosecution’s evidence).

The court continued, later in the 92 page opinion:

Even taking the accused’s submissions at their highest, the suggested failure
to check and investigate the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses, and
any other relevant evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession, or to reveal the
alleged weaknesses in the accounts of Intermediary 316 and Witness 157,
cannot properly be characterised as “illegal conduct” of a kind that would
make it “repugnant” or “odious” to continue the trial of the accused.
Similarly, the suggested breaches of the accused’s rights under Article
54(l)(a) and (b) of the Statute would not constitute such a serious violation
of the statutory safeguards as to make his trial ipso facto unfair. The
Chamber is persuaded that it will be jable, at the end of the case, to review in
detail the instances in which it is suggested the prosecution failed in its duty
to ensure that it was submitting reliable evidence. If the Chamber concludes
that this occurred in any of the instances relied on by the defence, the
appropriate remedy will lie in the Court’s approach to the evidence in
question, and particularly the extent to which it is to be relied on. A failure
to ensure that the Chamber has received reliable evidence, especially when
the prosecution was on notice that significant doubts existed in relation to
material in question, may affect the Chamber’s conclusions on the relevant
area or issue. On the facts advanced by the defence on this issue, the
suggested failings on the part of the prosecution – including the suggestion
that on occasion the Prosecutor deliberately avoided the process of
verification – are not so egregious as to necessitate the termination of the
trial.

The trial has, since the issuance of this order, resumed. It is not clear how much longer the trial might last at this point. Lubanga was the leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and is alleged to have used child soldiers in his army.  Lubanga is the first person to face war crimes charges in the ICC.  His trial began in January 2009, and he has been in The Hague since 2006.

 

Lubanga Trial Resumes, Again

The trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo resumed this week after a four month break to consider renewed motions to dismiss.  The defense is now presenting its case and offered testimony that Lubanga had ordered the demobilization of child soldiers.  One witness testified that Lubanga’s group, the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) provided security in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) because no one else was able to do so.   There was testimony that Lubanga ordered the demobilization of all soldiers under 18 on three different occasions.  It is not clear if these orders may help to exonerate Lubanga or indicate that he was aware of the presence of child soldiers.  The defense seems to be that child soldiers were integrated into the UPC by assimilating other groups which had conscripted child soldiers, that Lubanga then ordered the child soldiers to be demobilized and his officers did not implement those orders.

Testimony continued today with a witness testifying that there was no forced conscription of child soldiers. The defense witness, Bede Djokaba Lambi Longa testified that there were not child soldiers in the UPC.  According to Longa, some soldiers were not tall, but he did not know them to be children.  There were children in the camps, but they were not soldiers according to Longa.

Lubanga is the first person to face charges in the International Criminal Court (ICC).  He is charged with conscripting and enlisting child soldiers as a war crime.  Lubanga was brought to the court in 2006, his trial began in January 2009, and the defense began presenting its case in January 2010.  The case was stopped in 2009 to consider the addition of new charges and in 2010 to consider the argument that he could not get a fair trial because of the actions of the prosecution in withholding apparently exclupatory evidence. The appeals chamber ultimately reversed that decision and the case is now resuming following a denial of another motion to suspend the case.  A timeline of the trial is available here. Disclosure by the prosecution has been a continuing issue.

International Criminal Court Announces Indictments in Kenya

Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) today announced the indictments in the post-election violence in Kenya.  The court has combined the cases into two indictments with three accused each.

The court issued an indictment against William Samoei Ruto,  a suspended Minister of Higher Education, Science and technology of the Republic of Kenya; Henry Kiprono Kosgey,   Minister of Industrialization of the Republic of Kenya and the Chairman of the
Orange Democratic Movement; and Joshua Arap Sang,  head of operations at Kass FM in Nairobi.

The court found:

reasonable grounds to believe that Ruto and Kosgey are criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators (i.e., committing crimes through another person(s)) in accordance with article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer and persecution.

The Pre-Trial Chamber II was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Sang otherwise contributed to the commission of the crimes in accordance with article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.

The court did not find reasonable cause to for an additional count requested by the prosecutor, Torture.  The court issued a summons for the three, requiring that they appear before the court on April 7.  The court’s order is available here.

An interesting addition to the discussion was the court’s determination that the prosecutor had claimed two modes of liability for the accused:

as co-perpetrators, or in the alternative” as
falling under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute. Later, under the section on modes of
liability, the Prosecutor alleged that the three persons’ criminal responsibility fits as
“indirect co-perpetrators, or in the alternative, as co-perpetrators” or as common
purpose liability under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute.
36. Although the Prosecutor may generally charge in the alternative, he should be
consistent throughout his Application about the actual mode(s) of liability that he
intends to present to the Chamber. Moreover, the possibility for the Prosecutor to
charge in the alternative does not necessarily mean that the Chamber has to respond
in the same manner. In particular, the Chamber is not persuaded that it is best
practice to make simultaneous findings on modes of liability presented \ in the
alternative. A person cannot be deemed concurrently as a principal and an accessory
to the same crime. Thus, it is the Chamber’s view that an initial decision has to be
made on the basis of the material provided, as to whether there are reasonablegrounds to believe that Ruto, Kosgey and Sang bear criminal responsibility for the
crimes against humanity that occurred in the specific locations in the Republic of
Kenya, as discussed in section II above, either as co-perpetrators, indirect coperpetrators,
or any other form of liability presented or that the Chamber finds
appropriate.

The court also issued a summons for the appearance of: Francis Kirimi Muthaura,  Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet of the Republic of Kenya; Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,  Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance of the Republic of Kenya; and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Chief Executive of the Postal Corporation of Kenya.

The court found:

reasonable grounds to believe that Muthaura and Kenyatta are criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators in accordance with article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts.

The Chamber was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Ali otherwise contributed to the commission of the crimes in accordance with article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.

The decision in this case is available here.

In both cases, Judge Hans Peter Kaul dissented, though he has yet to issue a written position.

Pre-Trial Chamber Confirms Charge in Darfur Case

Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued a finding confirming the charges against Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo.  The court statement said the court  found that Banda and Jerbo should stand trial for three war crimes:

  • violence to life and attempted violence to life;
  • intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units and vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission; and
  • pillaging.

The court included the following information supporting the charges:

These crimes were allegedly committed during an attack led by Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo and other commanders and directed against the compound of the African Union Mission in Sudan at Haskanita on the evening of 29 September 2007. The Chamber found substantial grounds to believe that the attack was directed to personnel, installations, material, units and vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which were entitled to the protection afforded to civilians and civilian objects.

Banda and Jerbo appeared voluntarily before the court, following the lead of Bahar Idriss Abu Garda who also appeared voluntarily, but won a dismissal at the confirmation of charges hearing.  The court has also issued indictments against the President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Ahmad Harun, and Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayab.  The situation in Darfur was the first case referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council.  The second, Libya, was referred last week.

To date, Sudan has refused to turn the indictees over to the court, so the only ones who have appeared are the three who have appeared voluntarily.

The seventy five page decision is available here. There are currently three cases in trial stage at the ICC, the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a joint case against Matthieu Ngdolo Chui and Germain Katanga, and the case against Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo.  Another accused, Callixte Mbarushimana has recently arrived in The Hague. In addition to the Sudan accused at large, there is one accused from the Democratic Republic of Congo still at large and three from Uganda who have not yet appeared before the court.

There may be other indictments that have not yet been made public.  Indictments in the post-election violence in Kenya case were also released today.

Lubanga Trial to Re-Open

The trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo will re-open soon.  The trial was stopped for a few months while the trial court considered a defense motion to dismiss for the prosecution’s failure to provide disclosure as required.

Part of the issue has been the appearance of two witnesses for the defense who testified that two witnesses for the prosecution had stolen their identity and falsely claimed to have been child soldiers. This led to a fight about the identity of the prosecution investigator, or intermediary in the parlance of the court, who found those witnesses and a lengthy delay while the prosecution argued it could not disclose the intermediary’s identity.  The court has since issued a number of decisions clarifying the disclosure obligations of the prosecutor and whether the delay in meeting those obligations prejudiced the defense.

Lubanga was the first defendant in ICC custody, arrested in 2007, his trial began in January 2009.  The defense began presenting their case in January, 2010.  The case was halted over the summer because the trial court ruled that Lubanga could not get a fair trial because of the disclosure issues.  A timeline of the trial, through the halt in 2010, is available here.

The appeals chamber reversed the trial court’s finding that Lubanga could not get a fair trial, finding that the trial chamber had not explored sanctions sufficiently.  The trial restarted then stalled on a motion to dismiss from the defense. A resumption date for the trial has not been announced.

Lubanga is accused of recruiting, conscripting, and using child soldier as war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The fairness of the trial is an issue raised again and again in this case.  Failure to provide a full and fair process to the defense will make the court less credible.

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